Accra faces an unending cycle of environmental catastrophe. Recent weeks have once again exposed the city to devastating floods, dangerous building collapses, and fire hazards that threaten the safety of residents. The Greater Accra Resilient and Integrated Development (GARID) project was conceived as the definitive response to this vulnerability.
It was born from the tragedy of the June 3, 2015, floods that claimed over 150 lives and caused massive economic losses. Nearly a decade later, the city remains fragile, forcing us to question whether the remaining financial and operational resources are truly enough to secure our future.
GARID is a major urban resilience program in Ghana, funded by the World Bank. Its primary goal is to address the chronic issues of flooding, poor solid waste management, and the lack of basic infrastructure in the Greater Accra Region, with a specific focus on the Odaw River Basin.
The project is designed to mitigate disaster risks and improve living conditions for residents in high-risk, low-income, and flood-prone communities by implementing structural and non-structural measures to reduce the impact of perennial flooding, improving waste collection, disposal, and infrastructure to prevent the dumping of debris into drainage systems, which often exacerbates flooding, improving access to basic services such as drainage systems, roads, and sanitation in targeted informal settlements, and incorporating long-term planning to help the capital city adapt to climate change and environmental hazards.
The project involves a multi-sectoral approach, coordinating various government ministries and agencies to ensure effective delivery. Key stakeholders involved include the Ministry of Works and Housing and the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources as the implementing agency, the Hydrological Services Department (HSD), Lands Commission, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and seventeen (17) Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies (MMAs) integrating efforts to transition from “siloed” operations to a more unified, sustainable approach to urban development in Greater Accra, ultimately aiming to improve the quality of life for millions of residents living in vulnerable neighbourhoods.
The financial narrative of the project is complex. While the initial approval for the project reached 350 million USD, the reality on the ground is different. The World Bank reallocated 65 million USD of that total toward emergency COVID-19 response efforts. This reduced the effective pool of funding available for core infrastructure to approximately 285 million USD. With over 118 million USD already spent from the 127 million USD drawn down so far, as of June 2025, the margin for error is shrinking rapidly.
Spreading the remaining capital across 17 metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies is an immense challenge. The Odaw Basin is a geographically complex area, and the cost of major engineering works is high. When one considers the scale of the damage caused by recent storms and the high cost of climate adaptation, the question arises of whether the remaining funds can cover the extensive scope required.
The Imani Centre for Policy and Education study in November 2025 on enhancing governance and accountability for climate adaptation highlights that while the project has achieved some success in drainage improvements and waste management, the progress is often incremental rather than transformative. Beyond the numbers, the project suffers from uneven institutional capacity.
The institutional assessment shows that while the governance architecture is solid, the operational performance varies greatly. Some project implementation units demonstrate strong technical proficiency, but others struggle with severe staffing gaps and a lack of necessary engineering tools. This disparity leads to inconsistent results. Feedback from communities like Alogboshie paints a frustrating picture of this struggle.
Residents there continue to face flooding because work on the Odaw River remains incomplete. The project duration has been extended to 2027 to account for delays, but contractor performance remains a critical bottleneck. In Alogboshie, for example, a contractor failed to meet milestones despite receiving mobilization funds. If the money is available but the execution is stalled by poor contractor oversight and limited local capacity, then the funding amount becomes secondary to the management of these human and institutional failures.
This is where the roles of the Minister of Works, Housing, and Water Resources, and the Minister of State in Charge of Climate Change and Sustainability become vital. The current crisis requires more than just budget oversight. It demands an aggressive and hands-on strategy that moves beyond traditional administrative duties.
The Ministers must prioritize three core areas to ensure the remaining GARID funds do not go to waste. They must enforce stricter accountability for contractors. The Alogboshie case proves that funding is not the only obstacle to progress. When contractors fail to raise certificates or complete work within the agreed timelines, they must be replaced. The government cannot afford to subsidize inefficiency while the city drowns. Secondly, they must address the uneven capacity across the 17 assemblies.
It is unacceptable for some districts to lag behind due to simple staffing or tool shortages. A centralized strategy must identify these struggling units and provide them with the technical support or personnel they lack. The Ministries should act as a bridge, ensuring that best practices from the successful units are rapidly adopted by the weaker ones.
With the floods come building collapses and fire outbreaks. These are not separate problems. They are all symptoms of poor urban governance. Urban governance represents the complex web of relationships, policies, and mechanisms used to manage a city’s affairs. It involves both formal government structures and informal community networks working together to plan for the future, maintain essential infrastructure, and provide services to the public. At the highest level, urban governance requires an effective framework to coordinate multiple actors.
This often involves consolidating institutional responsibilities to reduce fragmentation. In addition, it relies heavily on the strength of the teams responsible for project execution and extends beyond government offices to include active participation by the people living in the city.
Buildings erected on waterways demonstrate a lack of enforcement in building codes and inadequate urban planning. Now the discussions have moved to demolishing structures on waterways. These are the very structures that building inspectors in the various assemblies supposedly permitted.
Ghana’s urban governance framework must evolve from a reactive, project-based model to a proactive, integrated system. Governance must mandate that basin-level resilience plans, including enforcement and regulation, community-led initiatives and ownership, and data systems, are formally integrated into the Annual Action Plans and budgets of every involved Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assembly.
By aligning these components, Ghana can move toward an urban governance model where infrastructure investments are protected by rigorous enforcement and active community participation.
We cannot afford to view GARID as a project that will fix itself. If the government continues to treat it as a routine infrastructure program, the city will remain vulnerable to the next disaster, and climate conditions will worsen due to challenges in implementing mitigation measures.
Source:IMANI
