At the entity level, Ghana Gold Board – GoldBod reported a surplus of approximately GH¢5.44 billion in its 2025 audited financial statements. Even after stripping out the GH¢4.5477 billion government grant for analytical purposes, GoldBod’s own disclosures still leave a surplus of approximately GH¢896.29 million.
On the face of GoldBod’s audited accounts, therefore, the entity did not report a loss in 2025.
What about the Bank of Ghana ? The Bank’s 2025 audited financial statements reported a net loss on gold deals of approximately GH¢9.05 billion, compared with about GH¢5.66 billion in 2024. This tells us that significant gold-related losses were recognised within the accounting boundary of the Bank of Ghana.
At the entire DGPP level, The International Monetary Fund estimates losses exceeding US$1.7 billion. The IMF attributes the losses principally to the pricing and exchange-rate structure surrounding the programme, together with service and assay fees and discounts associated with off-take arrangements.
This distinction between the three levels is important.
GoldBod’s GH¢5.44 billion surplus is an entity-level accounting result
The Bank of Ghana’s GH¢9.05 billion net loss on gold deals is also an entity-level accounting result, but within a different reporting entity.
The IMF’s US$1.7 billion estimate is a broader programme-level assessment.
These figures are therefore not necessarily contradictory, and they should not be used interchangeably.
Can all three positions exist at the same time?
Yes.
Accounting follows the entity that bears the relevant rights, obligations, costs and risks. If GoldBod earned income and incurred costs within its part of the arrangement, those amounts belong in GoldBod’s accounts.
If the Bank of Ghana financed particular transactions, carried the foreign-exchange exposure, absorbed pricing differentials, incurred off-taker costs or recognised valuation effects, those amounts would arise within the Bank of Ghana’s accounting boundary.
It is therefore possible for GoldBod to report a surplus, the Bank of Ghana to report gold-related losses, and the overall DGPP to generate a negative economic outcome at the programme level.
So should GoldBod be blamed for the entire US$1.7 billion programme-level loss?
From an accounting perspective, the answer is a No.
The fact that GoldBod participated in the programme does not automatically make every cost or loss associated with the programme an expense of GoldBod.
Equally, the fact that a loss was recognised on the Bank of Ghana’s books does not mean GoldBod’s activities should be excluded from scrutiny.
The appropriate approach in my view is to identify the source of each component of the loss.
Who determined the domestic purchase price?
Who financed the gold?
Who carried the foreign-exchange exposure?
Who paid the assay and service fees?
Who negotiated the off-taker agreements and discounts?
Who owned the gold at each stage?
Who determined when the gold should be sold or monetised?
Who received the proceeds?
And, ultimately, on whose books was each gain or loss recognised?
Until those questions are reconciled, assigning the entire programme loss to one institution risks confusing programme responsibility with accounting recognition.
A comprehensive programme-level reconciliation should trace every material gold flow from acquisition to final disposal or transfer into reserves.
It should show the quantity purchased, purchase price, international benchmark price, exchange rate applied, financing source, assay and processing costs, service fees, off-taker discounts, date and price of disposal, foreign exchange realised and the entity in which each resulting gain or loss was recognised.
That reconciliation should then bring together the Bank of Ghana, GoldBod and Government positions and show the net economic outcome to the Republic.
After that we should focus on how best to prevent avoidable losses and improve the efficiency of the programme because it has served Ghana well, abate the losses.
I propose the following:
First, the gold purchasing formula must be closely linked to the prevailing international benchmark price and an economically sustainable exchange rate. Ghana is substantially a price taker in the international gold market, so paying an excessive premium domestically creates a loss before the gold is even sold.
Second, the exchange-rate mechanism must be reviewed. If gold is purchased using one exchange rate but subsequently accounted for or monetised using another materially different rate, the resulting spread can significantly erode the margin.
Third, assay fees, service charges, refining costs and off-taker discounts must be commercially justified, competitively negotiated and subjected to regular value-for-money reviews.
Fourth, every significant batch or tranche of gold should have its own transaction-level profit-and-loss analysis. Management should be able to determine whether a particular transaction generated a positive or negative margin and identify exactly what caused the outcome.
Finally, Parliament and the public should receive periodic programme-level reporting, not only the separate financial statements of the participating entities. Entity accounts remain important, but they cannot by themselves provide the complete economic picture of a programme that cuts across several public institutions.
Written by Dickson Assan, CA
Chartered Accountant | SME & Financial Management Advisor
